The Correspondance of Guy Debord During the Portuguese Revolution by Noronha, Ricardo
Letters from 'Glaucos': the correspondence of Guy Debord 
during the Portuguese Revolution1  
Ricardo Noronha, IHC (NOVA FCSH) 
ricardonoronha@fcsh.unl.pt 
Guy Debord, founder of the Situationist International and 
film maker, kept a meticulous record of his correspondence 
between 1951 and 1994. Published by Fayard, the fifth 
volume of the correspondence includes several letters 
signed as 'Glaucos' (a character from the Iliad), addressed 
to Afonso Monteiro, Gianfranco Sanguinetti, Eduardo 
Rothe and Jaime Semprún. In those letters, Debord  
developed several analysis of the 'Carnation Revolution', 
arguing that 'the Portuguese proletariat' had gone 'further 
than the May 1968 movement'. Debord initially supported a 
local group, named Conselho para o desenvolvimento da 
Revolução social, but he would latter criticize it for not 
taking sufficient action. He also encouraged Jaime 
Semprún to write La Guerre Social au Portugal, a book 
published by Editions Champ Libre in May 1975. This 
articles analyses the correspondence of Debord between 
1974 and 1975, offering a critical assessment of how he 
related to the revolutionary situation in Portugal.  
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1. Introduction. A most peculiar correspondence 
 Even though the work of Guy Debord - founder of the Situationist 
International (S.I.) and author of The Society of the Spectacle - has 
long fallen under the radar of disciplines like philosophy, urban 
geography or cultural studies, most historiographical accounts tend 
to downplay the importance of his political engagement.2 In May' 68 
and its aftermaths, for instance, Kristin Ross considers that even 
though Debord was given to make 'megalomaniacal 
pronouncements about his own role' as 'instigator' of May'68, his 
writings had little influence in sparking the revolt, because only an 
elite readership had access to them.3 Gerd-Rainer Horn offers a 
more detailed analysis of Debord's trajectory, setting it against the 
backdrop of the 'colourful history and evolution of the Situationist 
                                                          
2 The theoretical work of Guy Debord and the S.I. was the subject of a special issue of October 
(Vol.79), edited by Thomas McDonough and published in the winter of 1997. It includes an 
article written by two former members of the S.I.: Clark and Nicholson-Smith 1997, pp.15-31. 
For a quite different reading of Debord's work, see Perniola and Vasile 1999, pp. 89-101. An 
issue of Grey Room (n.52) was dedicated to Debord's cinematographic work. Cf. Smith 2013, 
pp.7-17; Noys 2013, pp.94–107. Also on Debord's cinema, see Agamben 2004, pp.313-19; 
Noys 2007, pp.395-402. For an account of the life of Guy Debord, see Marcus 1989; Ohrt and 
Helstadt 1999, pp.13-35; Jappe 1999: Apostolide 2015. A concise and apologetic work on the 
Situationist International has been written by Wark 2011.  
3 Ross  2002, pp.193-94. Ross appears to have been misled by two citations taken out of 
context by Jappe 1999, pp. 46, 100. It is worth noting that Debord refused any role as leader 
and repeatedly emphasized the spontaneous nature of the May' 68 revolt, which the S.I. merely 
claimed to have anticipated.  
International', but he also concludes that his 'direct political impact 
on the events of 1968 must be regarded as rather limited'.4  
It would be enough to point out the large circulation of the pamphlet 
On the poverty of student life, written by Mustapha Khayati and 
largely inspired on previous texts of the S.I., to realize that the views 
of Ross and Reiner-Horn must be taken with a grain of salt. Indeed, 
such peremptory conclusions illustrate some of the limits of the 
interpretative tools commonly used within the discipline. By judging 
the impact of his actions through the angle of public notoriety, 
historians tend to miss out the fact that Debord - unlike, say, Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit (spokesman of the '22 March Movement'), Georges 
Séguy (leader of the Confédération Générale du Travail) or Jean-
Paul Sartre (probably the most famous French intellectual in the 
second half of the Twentieth Century) - deliberately chose to remain 
outside of the regime of visibility he called 'the Spectacle'. The 
underlying motive behind Debord's writings consisted in the unity 
between all aspects of human existence, summarized in the notion 
of 'totality'. His critique of separation was also aimed at the 
mechanisms of alienation, hierarchy and passivity that lie at the 
heart of classical politics, namely the division between those who 
govern and those who are governed. Accordingly, he opted for a 
                                                          
4 Horn 2007, pp.8-15. 
particular type of political engagement, that did not fit easily into the 
paradigm of either the 'militant' or the 'intellectual'.  
In other words, the historical impact of Debord's actions cannot be 
measured by the yardstick of public notoriety. We have to look 
beyond his published texts and take into account what he wrote, but 
also what he chose to do when he wasn't writing: letters, films, 
détournements, scandals, travels, encounters, etc. We also need a 
more subtle understanding of 'causality', particularly in what comes 
to the relation between the dissemination of texts and the historical 
impact of ideas. This argument has been developed by Greil Marcus 
(1989) and Michael Löwy (1998), for whom the collective imaginary 
that permeated May' 68 stemmed from the subterranean influence 
of a bohemian radical tradition, of which Debord was one of the 
most notable representatives. Put simply, it was not so much that 
people took to the streets because they read the texts of the S.I,, but 
rather that, once people took to the streets, the arguments laid out in 
those texts acquired a far-reaching significance, influencing 
collective action and setting the tone of the revolt.    
This, of course,  leaves much to say about the historical impact of 
Debord's political engagement, which cannot be resumed to May' 68 
and its immediate aftermaths. In a thorough and rigorous study, Tom 
Bunyard highlighted the contribution of Debord in the field of critical 
theory, but also his reflections as a revolutionary strategist, 
particularly after May' 68.5 This article offers an historiographical 
counterpart to Bunyard's book, centred around Debord's 
correspondence between April 1974 and November 1975, when the 
'Carnation Revolution' was raging in Portugal. Debord kept a 
meticulous record of his letters, part of which was published by 
Fayard in an eight-volume edition. He wrote many of them with the 
same acute sense of historicity that characterized his later texts, 
such as the Comments on the Society of the Spectacle or the 
Panegyric.6 There is also a remarkable literary investment at play in 
this correspondence, as if Debord was unwilling to write even the 
most mundane note without displaying the formal elegance of his 
style. Epistolography was, it should be noted, a celebrated art within 
the S.I., a loosely tied network of groups and individuals scattered 
around the globe, who relied heavily on personal encounters, 
occasional phone calls and a steady stream of correspondence. 
Sometimes resembling the entries of a diary, Debord's letters give 
us precious information about his personal trajectory after the 
dissolution of the S.I., in 1972, a relatively obscure period of his life.7 
Among other things, his published correspondence reveals that he 
                                                          
5 Bunyard 2017, p. 338, 354-57. For Debord's reflections on strategy, see: Shukaitis 2014, pp. 
251-68; Le Bras 2018.  
6 Debord 1998, p.73; Debord 2004, p.5. 
7 Unsurprisingly, his most recent biographer relies heavily on this previously unpublished material in 
order to describe this period. Cf. Apostolides 2015, pp. 378-389. 
was greatly occupied with a wide number of issues: ensuring the 
screening of his film, La Societé du Spectacle, in Paris; evaluating 
book proposals on behalf of Editions Champ Libre; planning trips to 
Florence; managing love affairs; making arrangements for his 
country holydays. Many of the letters also analyse historical events 
that captured his attention, offering us a glimpse of his political 
engagement during the 1970's. 
Debord revealed particular interest in the 'Carnation Revolution', 
initiated in Portugal on 25 April 1974, when the oldest dictatorship in 
Western Europe was toppled by a movement of junior-rank officers, 
with the purported aim of ending the war fought on the African 
colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. The quick fall 
of the dictatorship quickly developed into a revolutionary crisis, 
capturing international attention and becoming a mandatory topic of 
discussion amongst the radical Left.  
 The fifth volume of Debord's correspondence, comprising the period 
between January 1973 and December 1978, includes several letters 
signed 'Glaucos' (a fictional character from the Iliad, whose speech 
in Book 6 Debord was particularly fond of), addressed to Afonso 
Monteiro (a Portuguese who had lived in exile in Paris), Gianfranco 
Sanguinetti and Eduardo Rothe (both formerly members of the S.I.), 
Jacques Le Glou (an anarchist who had been involved with the 
Conseil pour le Maintenient des occupations [C.M.D.O.] during May 
'68) and Jaime Semprún (a Spaniard exiled in Paris).8 In those 
letters, Guy Debord ascribed the events that were unfolding in 
Portugal to a world-scale revolutionary crisis, of which May' 68 had 
been a precursor. Afonso Monteiro played a crucial role in this 
context, establishing a group named Conselho para o 
desenvolvimento da Revolução social ('Council for the development 
of social revolution'), to which Debord referred as 'our party in 
Portugal'. At a later stage, Debord eventually supported the 
publication, by Editions Champ Libre, of a book written by Jaime 
Semprún (La guerre sociale au Portugal). 
In addition to offering a unique - and frequently undervalued - 
perspective of his everyday life, the letters also reveal an ambiguity 
surrounding the commitment of Debord as a revolutionary, namely 
when he was confronted with the practical choice of coming to 
Portugal. When read under the light of some of his other texts, these 
letters reveal a number of contradictions - that Debord could neither 
overcome nor fully acknowledge - between his aesthetical 
inclinations and his reflections as a strategist. Debord's 
correspondence can therefore help us to assess what he considered 
to be the role of 'strategy', along with his personal engagement with 
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a revolutionary situation that seemed to fit within the historical epoch 
initiated with May' 68.  
 The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section 
analyses Debord's trajectory between the dissolution of the S.I. and 
the military coup of 25 April 1974. The third section covers the 
establishment of a 'Situationist' group in Lisbon, along with the 
gradual deterioration of Debord's relationship with its members. The 
fourth section offers an overview of the book written by Semprún, 
comparing it with other analysis written by authors with similar 
viewpoints. The concluding section sums up the main argument of 
the article. 
 
2. After the S.I.: developing a theory of historical action 
Judging by his correspondence, Debord spent the first months of 
1974 making arrangements for the screening of his film, La Societé 
du Spectacle (produced by Simar, a film company owned by Gerard 
Lebovici, who also published Debord's books trough Editions 
Champ Libre) in Paris.9 He also found the time to collect the sums 
that were due to him by Rob Van Gennep, who had acquired the 
publishing rights of Internationnale Situationiste (the magazine 
                                                          
9 According to the contract he proposed to Lebovici, Debord was to receive 150000 Francs for 
his work, along with 20 per cent of profits from the film's exhibition. Cf. Debord 2005, p.13 
formerly published by the S.I.).10 It had been only two years since 
Debord and Gianfranco Sanguinetti published The real split in the 
International.11 Written as the concluding piece to a long and bitter 
internal debate, the tract included sixty-one Thesis on the 
Situationist International and its time.12 May '68 had, according to 
Debord and Sanguinetti, confirmed the main tenets of the 
Situationist critique of modern capitalism, but it had also rendered 
that critique obsolete. The victory of the S.I. was, they argued, as 
debatable as 'the victory that the proletarian movement' had attained 
'by virtue of its renewal of the class war'.13 But now that its radical 
ideas had 'penetrated the masses', and the S.I. had fulfilled its 
purpose, most members had been seized by an attitude of 'passive 
contemplation', reinforced by the indulgent adoration that 
characterized 'pro-situ circles'.  
By announcing the extinction of the S.I., Debord and Sanguinetti 
wished to avoid converting its positions into an ossified 
'revolutionary ideology'. In their view, the aura created around the 
Situationists in the wake of May '68 had not been matched by their 
capacity to develop a coherent strategy to intervene upon the new 
historical situation. Now, that the 'last act' of a 'play concerning the 
                                                          
10 Debord 2005, pp.131-167. 
11 Debord and Sanguinetti 2003. 
12 On the 'orientation debate' in the S.I., see Bunyard 2017, pp.345-48. 
13 Debord and Sanguinetti 2003.  
world's destiny' was underway, the circumstances, scenery, extras 
'and even the spirit of the principal protagonists' had changed. 
'Autonomous revolutionary elements' and 'extremist worker's 
struggles' were emerging across the globe, forcing revolutionary 
theory to prove itself in the field of battle, 'the domain of danger and 
uncertainty' par excellence.  
The real split in the International was a landmark in Debord's 
trajectory. Ever since its creation, in 1957, the S.I. had sought to 
identify the main contradictions of modern capitalist society, along 
with the new forms of revolt that would result from them. A radical 
critique of alienation, urban planning, wage labour, art, leftist politics 
and student life had filled the pages of Internationnale Situationiste, 
along with analysis of new manifestations of class struggle, such as 
the Watts Riots.  
But this was no longer enough after May '68. For Debord and 
Sanguinetti, it had become necessary to take a stand in each 
particular struggle, conceiving a new form of revolutionary 
organization, capable of mastering the 'totality of its theoretical and 
practical weapons' while, at the same time, 'refusing all delegation of 
power to a separate avant-garde'. It was necessary for  the 'vast 
majority of the proletarian class' to 'hold and exercise all power, by 
organizing itself into permanent deliberative and executive 
assemblies'. Debord summed up these reflections in a letter to 
Eduardo Rothe, in February 1974:  
 
[…] the epoch no longer simply demands a vague 
response to the question "What is to be done?" […] It is 
now a matter, if one wants to keep up with the flow, of 
responding, almost every week, to the following question: 
"What is happening?" […] The principle work that I believe 
we now must contemplate is - as a complementary 
contrary to The Society of the Spectacle, which described 
frozen alienation (and the negation that is implicit in it) - the 
theory of historical action. One must advance strategic 
theory in this precise moment. At this stage, and to speak 
schematically, the basic theoreticians to retrieve and 
develop are no longer Hegel, Marx and Lautréamont, but 
Thucydides - Machiavelli - Clausewitz. Moreover, cinema - 
as we have agreed upon during an old discussion - has, 
when well handled, a potential for agitation that makes the 
best issue of I.S. look poor.14 
                                                          
14 Debord 2005, pp.126-27 (All passages of the published correspondence have been 
translated from French by  the author, unless stated otherwise). Many of the letters have been 
translated to English and are available at http://www.notbored.org/debord.html (Accessed in 14 
March 2020).    
Defined as a counterpart to the theory of the Spectacle, the 'theory 
of historical action' should result from a practical engagement with 
class struggle, offering a clear perspective of the battlefield and a 
rigorous identification of the opposing forces. It demanded the 
comprehensive study of strategic theory throughout history, so as to 
develop a scientia rei militaris adequate to the modern forms of 
class struggle. Debord's subsequent attitude must be understood at 
the light of the ambitious programme laid out in this letter.  
Even though he had severed his ties with many of the people with 
whom he had been involved during the previous fifteen years, 
Debord nevertheless possessed the capacity to manoeuvre with 
great skill across the European chessboard. Having re-established 
personal relations with Rothe and Paolo Salvadori (both of whom 
had been expelled from the Italian section of the S.I. in 1970), he 
travelled frequently to Florence, where he also met with Gianfranco 
Sanguinetti (and benefited from his financial support, at least until 
the partnership with Gerard Lebovici provided him with an 
alternative source of income).15 Debord would later encourage 
Sanguinetti to write a text on the complex political situation in Italy, 
which came out the following year, signed 'Censor' (Rapporto 
                                                          
15 Sanguinetti regularly transferred money to Debord's account in the Soviet-owned Banque 
commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord, between 1972 and 1974. Debord 2005, pp. 55, 57, 65, 67, 
145. 
veridico sulle ultime opportunità di salvare il capitalismo in Italia). It 
comes as little surprise that, shortly after hearing about the 25 April 
military coup, he started his letter to Sanguinetti with a brief line: 'We 
should be in Portugal this Spring...'.16  
 
3. 'Our Party in Portugal': the Conselho para o desenvolvimento 
da Revolução social  
The downfall of the Portuguese dictatorship offered the perfect 
opportunity to test the theses elaborated by Debord and Sanguinetti 
two years before. Shortly after writing to Sanguinetti, Debord sent a 
telegram to Afonso Monteiro - a Portuguese political exile who had, 
along with Francisco Alves, ensured the translation and publication 
of the Portuguese edition of The Society of the Spectacle - urging 
him to telephone to Paris immediately upon reaching Lisbon.17 On 8 
May, in a letter to Monteiro, he proceeded to analyse the situation: 
 
In Portugal today, everything can happen, but not in any 
way. The baroque beauty of the current situation - which, 
as it is today, obviously cannot last - appears to me to be a 
product of the objective, extreme poverty of Portuguese 
power, rather than the extreme stupidity of its capitalists or 
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General Spinola. Current Kerenskyism is dominated by a 
Kornilov (and Alvaro Cunhal is certainly not Lenin). […] The 
current atmosphere seems to me to resemble, not so much 
May '68 or Budapest [in 1956], but the liberation of Paris in 
'44 or Northern Italy in '45. The end of fascism and the 
Gestapo, the hunt for collaborators, etc. [...] Capitalist 
democracy, at the moment that Portugal belatedly wants to 
rejoin it, is in a state of advanced socio-economic crisis in 
England, France and Italy. The forms of government in 
these countries no longer function, while revolutionary 
contestation is affirmed in the factories and all sectors of 
society. Thus, if a truly radical current can constitute itself 
at this moment in Portugal, it must understand and say all 
of this. What is being offered to us here has already gone 
bankrupt elsewhere, 18 
 
This was not merely a letter written to a distant friend in a moment of 
shared joy. Debord acted as the informal leader of the 'truly radical 
current' he wished to see established in Portugal. He attributed a set 
of tasks, pointing out the necessity 'to make the current situation a 
real revolution for our time', taking 'all that has been made, said and 
                                                          
18 Debord 2005, pp.153-157.  
written, moreover, advanced in the world over the course of the last 
ten years' as its benchmark. He also took the care to underline, in 
accordance with his theory of historical action, that 'the exposition of 
a revolutionary perspective' should consist of 'describing and 
explaining what takes place day after day, without being satisfied 
with the ridiculous, abstract proclamation of general goals'. After 
suggesting three topics for agitation - the immediate end of the 
colonial war, denunciation of the governmental coalition and 
autonomy of worker's assemblies - Debord asked whether the arrival 
of 'other comrades' would be useful. He urged Afonso Monteiro to 
trust anyone coming 'on behalf of Glaucos' and, without awaiting for 
his response, wrote to Eduardo Rothe on that very same day:   
 
I know life is beautiful in Florence and I am sure the city 
has adopted you as you deserve. Notwithstanding, I 
believe a traveller that has walked the planet and 
participated in all kinds of uprisings will wish to see the 
Portugal of these days. The twofold question is: how will 
this strange current situation evolve and what can our 
friends do? We will try to answer both questions. [...] 
Afonso Monteiro will be in Lisbon around 18th, 20th May, 
the latest. [...] It will be necessary to come from the part of 
'Glaucos'. [...] Let me know: 1) whether you're going; 2) 
what you can conclude once you are there, after seeing 
Afonso; 3) whether it is desirable that I come (since I have 
a lot of important and urgent work to do, don't call me 
unless it's for a true revolution; in that case it would also be 
necessary to call Gianfranco, Paolo and surely others). The 
first condition would obviously be the possibility for 'our 
Party' to form - or perhaps join? - an autonomous group in 
Lisbon with its own basis of expression. I understand as 
little of Portuguese as I do of Dutch. 19 
 
One can conclude that Debord looked at the situation in Portugal as 
an opportunity to develop the 'theory of historical action'. With 
radical worker's struggles popping up like mushrooms, the 
Portuguese Communist Party co-opted into government and the 
economy experiencing the effects of an international crisis, this 
small country, far removed in the Southwest corner of Europe, 
seemed ripe for a revolution that could go beyond May'68. In any 
case, Debord refrained from committing himself to tasks he 
considered to be of the utmost importance. Shortly after telling 
Rothe that he had a lot of important work to do, he left Paris for 
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Champot (Auvergne), spending most of the summer in a mountain 
chalet.  
Before 'Rayo' (the nom de guerre taken by Rothe) could reach 
Lisbon, Monteiro and his friends wrote and distributed, on 29 May, a 
poster with a manifesto entitled Aviso ao proletariado português 
acerca da possibilidade da revolução social ('Address to the 
Portuguese proletariat about the possibility of social revolution', 
inspired in the Avviso as proletariato italiano sulle possibilita presenti 
della rivoluzione sociale, a text published by the Italian section of the 
S.I. in 1969). The Aviso reproduced many of the remarks made by 
Debord in his letter to Monteiro, analysing the situation in Portugal 
through a set of historical analogies. It argued that the 'price for a 
democratic Portugal' was too high to pay for European capitalism, 
and workers should therefore expect few concessions. It 
encouraged the proletariat to pursue autonomous forms of 
organization, denouncing the plans of the Left-wing parties to 
contain its demands, so as to make them look 'acceptable' for the 
ruling class. It ended with a few slogans concerning the self-
organization and autonomy of worker's assemblies, the end of the 
colonial war and the denunciation of the provisional government.  
On 11 June, Debord wrote to Sanguinetti, telling him that his own 
analysis had been confirmed by recent events, both in terms of how 
'the Stalinists' behaved and, more importantly, in what concerned 
'the subversive possibilities scattered in the proletariat'.20 The next 
day he wrote to Afonso Monteiro, congratulating him for the Aviso 
and adding that his letter 'magnificently described the very 
atmosphere of a revolutionary crisis'.21 In 25 June, in a letter sent to 
Jacques Le Glou,  Debord did not hesitate to claim most credit for 
the poster to himself: 
 
I have received very good news from friends in Lisbon. It is 
still not May '68 there, but it has many of its traits; and all 
this can even go still further, if the Stalino-Spinola 
repression - which has clearly begun - does not succeed in 
destroying the entire movement. Before leaving Paris, I 
sent down there several theses on what is happening and 
what could happen; and you can rightly suspect that no 
one was spared, except the revolutionary proletariat. All 
this has produced a superb poster, pasted on the walls of 
the town on 26 May by the 'Conselho para o 
desenvolvimento da revolucao social' - thus, here is the 
new flag, or title, of "our party" in the current period.22  
                                                          
20 Debord 2005, p.166. 
21 Debord 2005, p.168.  
22 Debord 2005, pp.171-172.  
 
Debord wrote to Eduardo Rothe the following day, noting that the 
Aviso (which he considered to be 'magnificent') had said 'the truth 
that all the other people live without knowing or without wanting to 
enunciate', namely that the ultimate goal of the wild strikes was to 
'bring down political economy'.23 He added that the 'participation of 
the Stalinists in the government' had become the 'modern form of 
counter-revolution' in a Europe that was 'collapsing'. Assuming that 
the Conselho was 'in contact with revolutionary workers', he 
emphasized the need for them to constitute 'their own liaisons (not 
only in street demonstrations and strikes, but in factory and 
neighbourhood assemblies)'. The importance of making the situation 
in Portugal known abroad was stressed once again: 
 
 If you can lay your hands on recently filmed documents 
(through the procedures of our 'Furniture Commission' of 
May '68 or by being in contact with cameramen or students 
at a film school), this would be very precious for a future 
cinematographic exposition of this moment. Furthermore, if 
you have time, one can also envision publishing a book in 
Paris (narrative and documents), because the most radical 
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aspect of the situation is and obviously will remain hidden 
to foreigners, especially among the Left. Since you, dear 
Rayo, must write a book, this might be a good subject. I 
await more recent news from you concerning all that takes 
place. Long live the Conselho para o desenvolvimento da 
revolucao social! This is the slogan for the current period 
and the flag of 'our party'.24 
 
The prospect of publishing a book about Portugal was taken very 
seriously. In mid-July, Debord wrote to Gerard Lebovici, sending him 
a copy of the Aviso and asking him whether he would consider the 
possibility of publishing it, along with additional material.25 By now, 
however, his early enthusiasm was turning into growing concern. 
Eduardo Rothe returned to Florence in early August, and Debord 
wrote to him, complaining for not having received further news from 
Portugal, apart from an envelope containing leaflets and newspaper 
pieces.26 In a letter to Jacques Le Glou, on 9 August, he told him 
that the texts he received from Portugal had become 'increasingly 
difficult to translate'.27 He also anticipated an upcoming confrontation 
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between the 'dominant official force' and a 'contestation' that, 
according to Roth, resembled 'a thousand Mays and a dozen Lips'. 
In 28 September, writing to unspecified 'comrades', he mentioned 
the fact that the French 'post worker's struggle against alienated 
labour', along with the 'growing incapacity of the system to manage 
its services in a rational way', had caused his correspondence to be 
delivered with three months of delay.28 This could explains why he 
had not received news from Portugal during the summer of 1974.  
Be that as it may, the limitations of the group operating in Lisbon 
were becoming manifest. In a letter to Sanguinetti, on 8 October, 
Debord complained about the 'lyrical' and 'imprecise' letters he 
received from Lisbon, which didn't allow him to understand what the 
Conselho had done so far and what it was planning to do in the 
future. He was forced to interpret events through French 
newspapers, with the obvious limitations this implied: 
 
 If, at first, taking into account the totality of what happened 
in 25 April, it was easy for me to describe what necessarily 
had to happen, what the several forces would tend to do, 
and, finally, what was not impossible to occur - it is quite 
evident that after five months of a complex process, we are 
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increasingly unarmed to understand from afar what is 
likely, remote or about to happen; unless we are in touch 
with people concerned with letting us know in a proper way 
what they think about the most important factors and the 
way in which the passage of time confirms or not each one 
of their precise evaluations.29  
 
As news from Portugal became scarcer, Debord's interest in what 
was happening there also started to fade. He travelled to Italy 
shortly after this letter, along with his wife, Alice, to join Sanguinetti 
in a trip to Venice, Florence and Rome. His correspondence 
suffered an interruption at this point, and he would only be back in 
Paris in December. In January, in a letter to Sanguinetti, he noted 
that while the 'Stalinist direction in Portugal' had 'installed itself 
everywhere much more quickly than its real strength' would suggest, 
this didn't prevent it from facing the serious threat of 'Leftist 
demonstrations'.30 He added that three months had passed since he 
had last received a letter from 'our Portuguese'. 
News from Lisbon eventually arrived on 14 February, in a letter 
written by Afonso Monteiro and signed as 'Ulysses'. Debord 
responded ten days later, admitting the possibility that previous 
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letters had been lost during the post worker's strike.31 He considered 
a demonstration organized by Workers Committees (InterEmpresas) 
in Lisbon, on 7 February, to be an historical landmark, since 'the 
modern proletariat had never gone as far as this'. He also ventured 
that the 'Stalinists, the military and others' would now be 'running to 
the elections of the Constituent Assembly', so as to 'make appear a 
legality that one can defend'. Finally, he made several direct 
questions: 
 
At this moment, what is the degree of your "influence", and 
I'm not referring to the theoretical aspect, but in terms of 
direct contacts? What are you chiefly doing and what can 
you do? In what way can one help you? At present, can we 
consider that the proletariat is saying everything by itself 
and is in a position to impose by force what it is saying? 
What ideas dominate the Interenterprise Committee? (For 
example, what is its position on the elections, at what point 
do they feel that the Stalinists would like to put them down 
by force?) Who has been delegated by the committees? 
(Do Leftist groups play an important role in them? And 
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which ones?) How can you address yourself to the 
assemblies, to the Committee, etc.?32  
 
In spite of the relatively cordial tone, these questions expressed his 
growing concern with the lack of activity of the Conselho. In an 
attempt to encourage his 'Portuguese comrades', Debord suggested 
that they prepare a new poster, similar to the Aviso, capable of 
showing 'the profound meaning of this autonomous organization 
[Interempresas], the very logic of its action and to put it on guard 
against all those who would fight against it'. A new letter would 
follow in March. After Debord met with 'Penelope' (Antónia Monteiro, 
married to Afonso Monteiro) and 'Rayo' (Eduardo Rothe) in Paris, he 
offered Afonso Monteiro 'the most concise summary' of his own 
opinions: 
 
1) Portugal is currently undergoing a proletarian revolution 
and it will almost certainly be defeated. [...] 2) Your public 
activity in the movement has remained below what can be 
done, because you have taken excellent positions, but too 
rarely. [...] I regret a little that you did not call upon me in 
September. It seems to me that at that moment - several 
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days before the 28th - you had not really taken into account 
the first autonomous demonstration of the workers, the 
tract for which I have only seen now; it was reserved in its 
form, but contained quite clear, radical allusions. [...] At the 
stage that has now been reached, I suppose that it is quite 
late for groups with very limited means to have a great 
usefulness: because everything will be played out in a 
much larger theatre and the three blows have been struck. 
3) The revolutionary situation in Portugal is almost totally 
unknown in all the milieus - even the extremist ones - of all 
countries: whatever happens, it will be important to publish 
the maximum of the truth outside of Portugal.33 
 
Debord insisted once more on the need for a book, regretting the 
fact that the material written by 'Rayo', however 'eloquent in 
describing the modern revolution in general', contained very little 
about the specific features of the Portuguese Revolution. 
 He wrote again to Afonso and Antónia Monteiro, on 10 April, telling 
them he was 'touched' by their invitation to come to Lisbon.34 He 
nevertheless remained evasive, arguing that this would depend on 
the possibility of 'doing something useful on behalf of the 
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movement', since he had no intention of travelling to Portugal 'as a 
tourist'. After repeating that a small group like theirs stood little 
chance of influencing the course of events, Debord insisted on the 
importance of producing a book. However, he added that he no 
longer counted upon 'Rayo' to write it, since they had ended their 
relation over 'futile personal affairs' (which he chose not to reveal).  
Debord was now using the expression 'our party' in a much broader 
and unspecified way, probable inspired by  Karl Marx's letter to 
Ferdinand Freiligrath, in 1860, where the former claimed his 
allegiance to a 'Party in the broad historical sense', that is, 'a Party 
that is everywhere springing up naturally out of the soil of modern 
society', taking on different forms according to time and place.35 On 
20 May, while advising Sanguinetti about the best way to respond 'to 
the shadowy imputations of the Italian police and the Stalinists' 
against him, Debord told him that he should openly declare that a 
'situationist current' was 'easily recognizable in the most advanced 
struggles in the factories of Europe' and it was 'globally well known 
that, at the moment, it is especially in Portugal that, with the greatest 
success, it fights capitalism, Stalinism and its captains, reformism 
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and what remains of fascism.'36 On 24 July, in another letter to 
Sanguinetti, he made a similar remark:  
 
In Portugal, 'our party' has made immense progress. The 
open struggle between the Stalinists and their generals, on 
the one hand, and Soares and all of the moderates and 
traditional counter-revolutionaries, on the other hand, 
seems to be the final battle that will decide which side will 
be the master of the State that will have to confront the 
workers, make them keep quiet and quickly put them back 
to work - or perish.37 
 
The 'party' to which Debord alluded was no longer a concrete group 
of people, the 'truly radical current' he had envisaged in May 1974. It 
had become a vague denomination, extended to all those who 
struggled against capitalism and challenged the authority of the 
State. Even though he was still concerned with the strategic 
challenges posed by the Carnation Revolution, Debord was now 
reduced to watch it from afar and seemed more concerned with a 
text that Sanguinetti was writing about Italy, that would eventually be 
published under the title Rapporto veridico sulle ultime opportunità di 
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salvare il capitalismo in Italia.  Debord did, however, maintain the 
project of publishing a book about class struggle in Portugal. Since 
neither Rothe nor Monteiro seemed able to write it, he turned to his 
Parisian contacts. Jaime Semprún, whom he had met in Paris, 
through Rothe, took up the task, delivering it in less than a month. 
 
4. 'All the world is like this town called Lisbon': La Guerre 
Social au Portugal 
Published by Éditions Champ Libre, La Guerre sociale au Portugal 
came off the printing press on 16 May 1975.38 It relied heavily on the 
material collected by Eduardo Rothe and other members of the 
Conselho Para o Desenvolvimento da Revolução Social, along with 
the analysis made by Debord and a few pieces published in the 
French press. The book was a short but elegant piece of prose, 
written in the baroque style that Debord and Sanguinetti appreciated 
so much. It opened with a detournement of a song by the Lincoln 
Brigade (formed by North American volunteers who fought in the 
Spanish Civil War): 'All this world is like this town called Lisbon'.39  
La guerre sociale au Portugal covered the entire revolutionary 
process until the Spring of 1975, highlighting its most decisive 
moments: the 'wildcat' strikes of May and June 1974, the repression 
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of workers at TAP (the Portuguese airline company) by the military 
on 27 August 1974; the demonstration organized by the workers of 
Lisnave (a large shipyard located across the river from Lisbon), in 12 
September 1974 (prohibited by the government and considered a 
'provocation' by the Portuguese Communist Party); the confrontation 
between Spínola and the Left in 28 September 1974 and 11 March 
1975; the demonstration organized by Interempresas in 7 February 
1975 (which was also prohibited by the government, but drew over 
fifty thousand workers to the streets). The global significance of 
events in Portugal was repeatedly emphasized: 
 
The immensity of the present tasks faced by Portuguese 
workers is that of modern revolution in all countries, and 
the strangeness of what is happening in Portugal is not of a 
geographic, but rather historical nature: the proletariat, 
which is everywhere abandoning the same night, in which 
only the watchmen differ, must learn and reinvent by itself 
everything it does; but today more than ever it is able to do 
so because it has freed itself from all the ideological 
mediations coming between it and the meaning of its own 
actions; and it must forcibly do so in Portugal, because its 
first actions have already filled its enemies with such terror 
that only by annihilating them will it be able to avoid their 
reprisals.40  
 
Semprún ruthlessly denounced the Portuguese Left, depicting it as a 
distorted mirror image of its French counterparts: 'the Stalinists' of 
the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), but also the Socialist Party 
(PS) led by Mário Soares and the numerous far-left organizations, 
amongst which the Maoists and Marxist-Leninists were the more 
numerous. At certain points, the book revealed some difficulty in 
grasping the most intricate aspects of the situation: it greatly 
underestimated the capacity of the PCP and the Intersindical (the 
trade-union confederation under its influence) to recuperate and 
institutionalize worker's struggles; it failed to acknowledge the 
influence of the far-left over what it described as 'workers’ 
autonomy'; it downplayed the capacity of the Socialist Party to rally 
the large majority of counter-revolutionary forces against the 'radical' 
wing of the Armed Forces Movement (which comprised both the 
Far-Left and the PCP).  
In spite of these shortcomings, Semprún offered a vivid account of a 
process about which little was known outside of Portugal. Unlike 
many foreign observers, he placed class struggle at the centre stage 
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of historical events, portraying the oscillations of the institutional 
sphere as a mere smokescreen devised to conceal it. He also 
offered an epic resonance to the antagonism between the 
'revolutionary proletariat' and the different factions competing for 
State power: 
 
If ever an event projected its shadow ahead of it long 
before it took place, one must mention the decisive 
confrontation between the Portuguese proletariat and all of 
its enemies. [...]  Because the historical initiative of their 
Portuguese comrades has already contributed to bring the 
struggle of Spanish workers to a new stage, and everything 
leads to believe that a decisive fight in Lisbon would act 
like an electrical shock to the masses, stirring up their old 
memories and revolutionary passions. The ongoing 
struggle is the second offensive of the revolutionary epoch 
which began in 1968 and, just like the first, brought ridicule 
upon all of the illusions of the previous epoch, all of the 
illusions concerning the stability of the existing order, this 
one bring ridicule upon all of the illusions about the 
subsequent instability and all of the illusions about the 
revolution. The Portuguese proletariat has precipitated the 
course of modern history. It can precipitate it even more, 
and even triumph. But whatever the outcome of this 
struggle, the world proletariat has reached a new point of 
departure of universal historical importance.41  
 
The distinguishing feature of Semprún's book was, however, its 
timeliness. Leaving aside the texts belonging to other political 
traditions (such as the ones written by Nicos Poulantzas, Paul M. 
Sweezy, Daniel Bensaïd, Alain Badiou or Tony Cliff 42), the majority 
of the analysis produced by the 'autonomous' or 'councilist' milieu 
were only published after the revolutionary tide in Portugal had 
waned out: Maurice Brinton's diary notes appeared on Solidarity in 
December 1975, Loren Goldner's essay was written in 1976, 
whereas Phil Mailer, who lived in Portugal throughout 1974-75, had 
his book printed in 1977.43 Unlike Semprún, neither of them took the 
risk of anticipating possible outcomes. Even though they all looked 
favourably upon worker's autonomy and denounced the attempts - 
undertaken by either the military, the Communist Party or the Far-
Left - to build a regime of 'State Capitalism', Brinton, Goldner and 
Mailer contented themselves with writing an epitaph to a movement 
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that had already been defeated, whereas Semprún attempted to 
single out the conditions under which that movement could still 
emerge victorious.44 Another important difference is that most of the 
aforementioned authors (of all areas of the Left) derived their 
explanation of events from a generic (and sometimes rather 
schematic) characterization of Portuguese society, whereas 
Semprún's narrative emphasized the importance of contingent 
decisions, taken by specific historical actors, and tried to explain the 
underlying logic that lay behind them. More than an accurate 
historical assessment, La Guerre Sociale au Portugal should be 
read as a historical document, that shows how an informal post-
Situationist current, scattered around Europe (but with an 
undisputed Parisian centre), analysed the Portuguese revolutionary 
process from afar, as it was unfolding. Rather than a balance sheet, 
the book was an attempt to develop a theory of historical action 
aligned with the demands of its epoch. It was also an illustration of 
how difficult it was to conceive a revolutionary strategy that went 
beyond the national framework. Semprún assumed all too frequently 
that what was happening in the streets of Lisbon could be 
understood by ways of analogy and equivalence, remaining trapped 
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within the parochialism of Parisian intellectual life and unable to 
grasp crucial aspects of the intricate and volatile revolutionary 
situation in Portugal.  
Shortly after the book reached the shops, Debord wrote to Lebovici, 
telling him it was 'magnifique'.45 He also wrote to Semprún by the 
end of May, congratulating him and urging him to publish the book in 
Spain with the utmost urgency: 
 
I believe that this is the first time that one can read such a 
book before the failure of a revolution. Until now, 
consciousness has always arrived too late, at least in 
publishing! This thunderclap was permitted by the 
slowness of the Portuguese process, the product of the 
great weakness of all the factions that coexist in a 
disequilibrium slowed down from all sides (certain 
weakness with respect to the immensity of their tasks, 
because even the repressive task with which the Stalinists 
are changed is no small affair).46  
 
Debord was now busy working on his fifth film, that would come out 
in October, with the title Refutation of All the Judgments, Pro or Con, 
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Thus Far Rendered on the Film “The Society of the Spectacle”. He 
had asked the production team, led by Martine Barraqué, to acquire 
as many images from Portugal as possible.47 His comments on the 
Portuguese revolutionary situation occupied pride of place: 
 
There are people who understand, and others who do not 
understand, that the class struggle in Portugal has from the 
very beginning been dominated by a direct confrontation 
between the revolutionary workers organized in 
autonomous assemblies and the Stalinist bureaucracy 
allied with a few defeated generals. Those who understand 
such things will understand my film; and I don't make films 
for those who don't understand such things, or who make it 
their business to prevent others from understanding.48  
 
Like Semprún's book, this was an attempt to develop a theory of 
historical action, capable of clarifying the meaning of historical 
events as they unfolded. But Debord now had to rely primarily on the 
news written by the correspondent of Le Monde, Dominique 
Pouchin, in order to keep up with the revolutionary situation in 
Portugal. This originated several errors of interpretation, as when he 
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concluded that the occupation of the premises of República (a 
private newspaper aligned with the Socialist Party), undertaken by 
print workers, had been little more than an attempt by 'the Stalinists' 
to silence their opponents.49 Indeed, as late as 24 June, when the 
balance of forces in Portugal was leaning more and more towards 
the Socialist Party (supported by the U.S. Embassy and the 
governments of the U.K., G.D.R. and Sweden), Debord still 
considered that the true battle would be waged between 'the cynical 
Stalinist infiltrators and the Workers' Councils'.50 The reflections he 
had shared with Sanguinetti a year before - concerning the difficulty 
'to understand from afar what is likely, remote or about to happen' - 
had given way to a set of assertive judgments that often missed their 
mark. Debord was also growingly disdainful of the Conselho para o 
desenvolvimento da revolução social, warning Semprún against the 
'affective phenomenon, typically pro-situ, of jealousy' that should be 
expected from 'those who have done nothing'.51 In a letter to 
Sanguinetti, in mid-August, he also revealed the high regard he held 
for himself: 
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The most recent news from Lisbon is so obscure and so off 
the subject (and especially with respect to all of my 
questions) that I am worn out from responding. The crisis 
appears to be at a decisive turning point and the talent of 
our poor friends completely insufficient to play a notable 
role in it.[...] From whence comes a multitude of pressing 
invitations to bring me to Lisbon in April, whereas it was in 
October 1974 that they should have summoned me.[…] As 
you have recently said, and with great justness, "there are 
not three great men in France," and I have made it known 
that one of them will only displace himself, at this stage, if 
he is summoned by an autonomous assembly of workers!52 
 
Even though he was gradually losing interest on the subject, Debord 
felt the need for a final mise au point. He therefore addressed a long 
letter to 'Afonso Monteiro and friends' on 15 November:   
 
Your recent invitations to bring me to Lisbon as soon as 
possible seem to call for a clear response. For more than 
six months, I have discerned several ambiguities 
concerning this question (which is obviously linked to the 
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question of what you yourselves are, that is to say, of what 
you do and how you do it). [...] You certainly know that, 
after what I have had the occasion to do for a great number 
of years, the first 'duty' that I have with respect to the 
revolution in all countries is to demonstrate that in no way 
do I have the intention or the obligation to hold the role of 
leader (in the same way that others have failed the more 
simple obligation to prove that the success of their avant-
garde critique does not oblige them to compromise with the 
dominant organization of things and thus be recognized 
and recuperated by it). [...] I would obviously be disposed 
towards supporting the movement itself, not, as you say, 
with my "experience" - everyone in Portugal has more 
experience with the current situation than I have had - but 
with my talents that could be used by it (as an analyst of 
the relationships of the forces at play from day to day, and 
as a military expert) where the movement would give itself 
the forms of consciousness and practical organization that 
would require this use of my capacities. But it is perfectly 
clear that you yourselves are not part of such a movement. 
[...] While the Portuguese proletariat has gone further than 
the May 1968 movement, in 18 months you have certainly 
not attained the importance and usefulness that the 
C.M.D.O. acquired in 18 days: a place from which "the 
process" expresses what it is and what it can do. [...] what 
have you done to make this immense experiment known to 
a world that is still unaware of it? Because a veritable 
victory in Portugal could more quickly take Europe where it 
wants to go and, inversely, a local defeat could be re-
played elsewhere and often.53  
 
Debord concluded his letter with the claim that he would only come 
to Lisbon in order to spend time with Leonor Gouveia, a former 
political exile he had met in Paris, of whom both he and Sanguinetti 
were very fond. Gouveia had gone to Mozambique during the 
summer, where she died of malaria.54 With her death, he concluded, 
there was nothing worth seeing in Lisbon anymore.  
The revolutionary crisis would come to an end ten days later, when 
a group of 'moderate' military officers defeated the 'radical' wing of 
the Armed Forces Movement. But even though order reigned in 
Lisbon, no bloodbath followed, and the decisive confrontation 
anticipated in La guerre sociale au Portugal failed to materialized, 
for reasons that go well beyond the scope of this article. Debord 
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would latter criticize Semprún for not having analysed the defeat of 
the Portuguese Revolution more thoroughly, instead of minimizing it, 
'as if it was a slight unevenness in the distance to be covered'.55 But 
all of this had now become secondary. As the revolutionary epoch 
opened by May '68 came to a close, the drama played out in 
Portugal started to fade into oblivion. It had become impossible to 
know whether all the world looked like Lisbon or the other way 
around.  
 
4. Conclusion. 'Men come and go as leaves' 
The correspondence of Guy Debord confronts us with two sets of 
problems. The fist corresponds to the difficulty of conceiving a 
genuinely international revolutionary strategy. While friendly 
relations between political organizations from different countries are 
quite common, the development of a shared strategy remains an 
entirely different matter. Organizing across the borders of the nation-
state requires the capacity to analyse events from a distance, which 
brings up the obvious problem of translation and communication. 
Furthermore, evaluating the prevalent correlation of forces - along 
with its variations across different sectors and regions - demands a 
profound understanding of context, as well as concrete liaisons on 
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the terrain. A radical current that wishes to move beyond a mere 
analysis of the existing situation, so as to interfere with it, is 
inevitably confronted with all sorts of challenges.  
This problem occasionally surfaced in Debord's letters, particularly 
when he emphasized the limits of what he was able to understand 
from a distance, but also when he expressed his doubts regarding 
what small groups were capable of doing in a major revolutionary 
situation. However, this did not prompt him to develop a more 
serious reflection on the topic of organization, apart from some 
scarce references to the need to act 'autonomously'. In the end, 
when Debord felt the need to provide an example of what he 
considered to be the proper role of a revolutionary organization, he 
simply turned back to the C.M.D.O., the collective briefly formed by 
the Situationists and a few compagnons de route in Paris during 
May '68. It was as if the Thesis on the S.I. and its time had never 
been written at all. The 'theory of historical action' remained a set of 
abstract principles, that could find neither the practical instruments 
nor the actors to become a material force.  
Which leads us to the second tier of problems, related with the 
difficulties in conciliating a bohemian style of life with the 
requirements of a strategic intervention upon the historical stage. An 
enthusiastic reader of texts from classical antiquity, Debord 
frequently measured his own actions against the yardstick of epic 
poetry: 
 
Other eras have had their own great conflicts, conflicts 
which they did not choose but which nevertheless forced 
people to choose which side they were on. Such conflicts 
dominate whole generations, founding or destroying 
empires and their cultures. The mission is to take Troy — 
or to defend it.56 
 
The choice of 'Glaucos' as a nom de guerre derived from the Sixth 
Book of the Iliad, where Homer has 'Glaucos' (a Lycian captain who 
comes to Troy to fight alongside its defenders) telling Diomedes 
(one of the mightiest warriors amongst the Greeks) that 'men come 
and go as leaves, year by year upon the trees', and 'so is it with the 
generations of mankind, the new spring up as the old are passing 
away'.57 It was the obvious dialectical resonance of the dialogue - 
with its stress on the fluidity of time - that caught the eye of Debord. 
But his choice of pseudonym - and it is worth recalling that Debord 
always used names of persons he admired, such as 'Gondi' (the 
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Cardinal of Retz, whose Mémoires he was very fond of) - is also 
revealing of how he perceived his own historical role.  
Debord had long been trying to develop a theory of historical action 
capable of matching his critique of the 'Spectacle', and he insisted 
that this required a direct involvement with the struggles that were 
unfolding across the globe. The Carnation Revolution appeared to 
be one of those great conflicts in which the fate of the world would 
be decided for generations. But unlike 'Glaucos', Debord chose not 
to come to Troy and join its defenders. In spite of the importance he 
attributed to the Revolution in Portugal, he preferred to spend the 
summer in Auvergne, with Alice Becker-Ho, before travelling to Italy 
to meet Gianfranco Sanguinetti. This makes it particularly difficult to 
understand why he would later lament the fact that he was not 
warned that a 'true revolution' was taking place in Portugal.  
 The reasons Debord invoked for not travelling to Lisbon are easy to 
understand. He could hardly have played a relevant role in a country 
where he did not speak the language and did not fully trust his 
personal contacts. However, many of his arguments need to be 
taken with a grain of salt. The notion that it had become too late, in 
the Spring of 1975, to intervene upon the revolutionary stage, for 
instance, ran against what Semprún wrote in a book that he helped 
to publish and considered to be 'magnificent'. Even after he became 
aware that a 'true revolution' was taking place, at a time when a 
decisive confrontation was building up, he nevertheless opted to 
remain in Paris. If the 'last act' of a play concerning the world's 
destiny was underway, demanding that revolutionary theory proved 
itself on the field of battle - 'the domain of danger and uncertainty by 
definition' - how could Debord refrain from joining a revolutionary 
process in which the proletariat had gone further than any time 
before? This contradiction was quite striking at times, making us 
doubt whether the motives he invoked in his correspondence were 
not merely pretexts to stay where he felt more comfortable. 
 The correspondence raises a few more questions. The fact that 
Debord relied on the French press to analyse the Portuguese 
Revolution is surprising, considering how frequently he denounced 
journalists for misjudging or distorting historical events. On the other 
hand, Debord emphatically claimed not to wish to 'command' others. 
However, as early as May 1974, he was practically dictating to his 
'Portuguese comrades' what they should say and do, as well as 
encouraging others to come to Lisbon, moving them across the 
European board as if they were pieces of his kriegsspiel.  
This suggests an insurmountable ambiguity, or, at the very least, an 
unresolved tension, between Debord's aesthetical inclinations and 
his strategic aspirations.58 That he never confronted himself with this 
problem becomes particularly evident in his last film, In Girum imus 
nocte et consumimur ignis, when Debord insists on the need to 
engage oneself in decisive battles, no matter what the conditions 
and the possible cost:  
 
Those who never take action would like to believe that you 
can freely determine the quality of your fellow combatants 
and the time and place where you can strike an 
unstoppable and definitive blow. But in reality you have to 
act with what is at hand, launching a sudden attack on one 
or another realistically attackable position the moment you 
see a favourable opportunity; otherwise you fade away 
without having done a thing. […] Despite the fantasies of 
the spectators of history who try to set up shop as 
strategists and who see everything from the vantage point 
of Sirius, the most sublime theory can never guarantee an 
event. On the contrary, it is the unfolding of an event that 
may or may not verify a theory. Risks must be taken, and 
you have to pay up front to see what comes next.59 
 
                                                          
58 This tension is partially touched in Bunyard 2017, p.352. 
59 Debord 1978.  
Debord kept on writing with the same peremptory tone, as if nothing 
important had happened, which suggests that he was impermeable 
to any sort of self-criticism. Keeping himself at a safe distance, he 
encouraged others to write about a revolution that he preferred not 
to join. In this regard, Paris quite resembled the vantage point of 
Sirius. Rather than Thucydides, Machiavelli or Clausewitz, this stand 
reminds us of Bartleby, the melancholic scrivener conjured by 
Melville's imagination, who simply preferred not to.  
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